Migration Policy and the Generosity of the Welfare State in Europe by Assaf Razin & Jackline Wahba
MIGRATION POLICY AND THE
GENEROSITY OF THE
WELFARE STATE IN EUROPE
ASSAF RAZIN* AND
JACKLINE WAHBA**
Immigration and the welfare state debate 
Public debate on immigration has increasingly fo-
cused on the welfare state amid fears that immi-
grants are a fiscal drain.Particularly there have been
increasing concerns that welfare-state generosity
works as a social magnet to immigrants.Over the last
20 years, Europe has attracted a substantial number
of immigrants (26 million) compared with the US
(23 million), Australia (1.6 million) and Japan
(0.5 million); (Boeri 2010). Europe also devotes a
larger fraction of GDP to social expenditure relative
to other immigration countries. Indeed, the Table
shows that the average aggregate social spending as a
percent of GDP for Europe, between 1980–95, was
around 21 percent compared to around 18 percent in
the US, 17 percent in Canada and 13 percent in Aus-
tralia. At the same time Europe, on average, attracts
more unskilled immigrants relative to the US,Canada
and Australia, which have a relatively high skill com-
position of immigrants.
At first glance this suggests that countries that have
generous welfare systems also have relatively more
unskilled immigrants, i.e., welfare state generosity
acts as a magnet for unskilled migrants.However,the
skill composition of immigrants depends on many fac-
tors, and in particular on the policy regime – namely
whether migration is free or restricted. In other
words, the generosity of the welfare state may affect
the skill composition of immigrants differently, de-
pending on which immigration policy is adopted.The
generosity of the welfare state, that is total govern-
ment spending on social insurance, welfare benefits,
social investment and public services,determines the
self-selection of potential migrants (supply-side mech-
anism) and the immigration policy in the destination
country (demand-side mechanism).
Previous evidence on the welfare state and 
immigration
Welfare migration has received considerable attention
in the literature, however, with mixed results. Several
studies have examined whether welfare-state generos-
ity acts as a magnet for migrants (see Brueckner 2000)
for a detailed review. A few studies, focusing on the
US, show that high-benefit states have more welfare-
recipient migrants than low-benefit regions.For exam-
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Austria 47.5 12.7 24.10
Belgium 65.7 18.3 25.18
Denmark 44.8 17.3 25.51
Finland 48.7 23.8 23.96
France 74.6 16.4 25.03
Germany 65.9 21.8 23.28
Greece 44.5 15 15.01
Ireland 13.6 41.1 17.14
Italy 52.9 15.4 19.66
Luxembourg 44.6 21.7 20.18
Netherlands 50.2 22.0 24.88
Norway 22 28.7 20.05
Portugal 59.7 18.6 12.25
Spain 28.7 18.5 18.67
Sweden 34.1 25.7 29.73
Switzerland 54.9 18.6 14.85
UK 34.1 34.9 18.16
Average 
Europe
46.26 21.8  21.04 
Australia 35.3 40.3 12.93
Canada 29.6 58.8 16.91




34.27 47.27  15.78 
Sources: Docquier, Frederic and Abdeslam Marfouk
(2006); OECD, Social Expenditure Database
(SOCX).
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ple, Borjas (1999) found that low-skilled migrants are
much more heavily clustered in high-benefit states, in
comparison to other migrants or natives.On the other
hand, Levine and Zimmerman (1999) found no sup-
port for the welfare magnet hypothesis in their analy-
sis of moves within the US.
As for OECD countries, again the findings are in-
conclusive. Pedersen et al. (2008) found only weak
and negative results for the welfare generosity on
migration flows to 27 OECD countries. However,
Peridy (2006) studied migration rates in 18 OECD
host countries from 67 source countries and found
that the host-source ratio of welfare-state benefits
has a significant positive effect on migration. Doc-
quier et al.(2006) studied the determinants of migra-
tion stocks in the OECD countries in the year 2000,
with migrants from 184 countries, classified accord-
ing to three education levels.They found that social
welfare programs encourage the migration of both
skilled and unskilled workers. However, the un-
skilled are motivated by social expenditure much
more than the skilled migrants.
There is little research on the issue of welfare mag-
nets and selectivity of migrants for the European
countries. Geis et al. (2008) found mixed effects for
welfare generosity on choosing France,Germany,the
UK and the US as a country for migration. De Giorgi
and Pellizzari (2009) explored the issue of welfare
migration across the countries of the pre-en-large-
ment European Union and found a significant but
small effect of the generosity of welfare on migration
decisions, though the effect is stronger for unskilled
workers.
One potential reason for the mixed results is that
none of those studies control for the migration re-
gime: whether immigration is free or restricted.
The effect of migration regime on the skill 
composition of immigrants 
In a free-migration regime, a typical welfare state
with relatively abundant capital and high total factor
productivity (implying relatively high wages for all
skill levels) attracts both unskilled and skilled mi-
grants. On the other hand, the generosity of the wel-
fare state attracts unskilled (poor) migrants, as they
expect to gain more from the benefits of the welfare
state than what they expect to pay in taxes for these
benefits:that is,they are net beneficiaries of the gen-
erous welfare state.In contrast,potential skilled (rich)
migrants are deterred by the generosity of the welfare
state. Thus the generosity of the welfare state shifts
the migrant skill composition towards the unskilled.
In the restricted-migration regime,these same consid-
erations lead host-country voters to open the door
wide to skilled migration and slam the door shut on
unskilled migration.Voters are motivated by two con-
siderations: how migration affects their wages, and
how it bears on the finances of the welfare state.
Typically, unskilled migration depresses the unskilled
wage and boosts the skilled wage.The opposite occurs
with skilled migration.The effect of migration on the
finances of the welfare state is common to all voters
of all skills, because skilled migrants are net contrib-
utors to the welfare state, whereas unskilled mi-
grants are net beneficiaries. From a public finance
point of view, native-born voters of all skills would
therefore opt for the skilled to come and for the un-
skilled to stay away to mitigate the fiscal burden.1
Hence, there is a need to consider the migration re-
gime when examining the effect of the generosity of
the welfare state on migration.
The EU as a case study
The European Union (EU-15) was host to some 20.1
million foreign nationals in 2000–01. Of these,
around 6 million people were EU-15 citizens living
in another EU-15 member state, i.e. benefitted from
free mobility,and some 14.3 million were third-coun-
try nationals (around 3.8 percent of the total popula-
tion of EU 15) who fell in the restrictive immigration
regime.The largest group of third-country nationals
residing in the EU are citizens of Turkey (2.6 mil-
lion), followed by Morocco (1.4 million); (OECD
2004). Thus, the European Union countries have
been facing intensive immigration pressure. In the
meantime, EU countries possess generous welfare
systems, though the generosity vary substantially
from one European state to another.
We have utilize free-movement within pre-enlarge-
ment EU-14 (old core) plus Norway and Switzer-
land
2 to examine the free migration regime and com-
pare that to immigration into the EU from two other
source-country groups to capture the immigration-
restricted regime. We test how the generosity of the
1 See Razin,A., E. Sadka, and B. Suwankiri, (2011).
2 Norway and Switzerland enjoy bilateral agreements with the EU,
ensuring free labor mobility.welfare state affects the skill composition of the
immigrants across policy regimes distinguishing be-
tween immigration from developed versus develop-
ing source countries.We control for the educational
quality of immigrants by standardizing cross-country
education quality differences using the Hanushek-
Woessmann (2009) cognitive skills measure. Since
immigrants with the same years of schooling may be
treated equally in a points system – although in real-
ity they may vary in their labor market productivity,
causing different fiscal burdens – this may introduce
a bias in estimates, in particular for LDC source
countries. If, on the one hand, immigration policies
favor immigrants with higher educational attainment
and there is no control for the quality of education,
this will overestimate the effect of skill composition
for LDC source countries.If,on the other hand,high-
ly educated immigrants are of poor quality, then
their productivity will not be that different from the
poorly skilled, and they will behave similarly by be-
ing net recipients rather than contributors to the
welfare state, resulting in an underestimate of the
effect of welfare generosity on the skill composition.
Thus not controlling for educational quality is prob-
lematic since a priori it is unknown which way the
results would be biased.
Another potential problem is that of endogeneity,
i.e. reverse causation between immigration and wel-
fare state generosity. Although we are interested in
how the generosity of the welfare state affects immi-
gration and its composition, we know that the rela-
tionship can also work in the opposite direction. Im-
migration might affect the generosity of the welfare
state, in particular the level of benefits in the host
country,because immigrants can influence the level of
benefits. For example, more immigration may lead to
lower levels of social spending per capita if migrants
are more likely to become unemployed or if migrants
come with large dependent families. Thus, we also
consider reverse causality in our estimations.
Finally,given that welfare considerations may be one
aspect affecting the skill composition of immigrants,
we control for the differential returns to skills in
both the source and the host country.The higher the
returns to skills in the host and the lower the returns
to skills in the source country, the more positive is
the effect on the skill composition of immigrants
(Borjas 1987). In addition, to capture recent immi-
gration policies,we take into account family re-unifi-
cation schemes, using past immigration stocks, and
the number of refugees and asylum seekers admit-
ted, both of which are likely to impact adversely on
the skill composition of immigrants. Hence the esti-
mation controls for a battery of other push and pull
factors.
The generosity of the welfare state: a social magnet
or a fiscal burden?
We have found evidence that the generosity of the
welfare state adversely affects the skill-composition
of migrants under free-migration (social magnet hy-
pothesis),but it exerts a more positive effect under a
policy-controlled migration regime (fiscal burden
hypothesis), even after controlling for the differen-
tial returns in skills in source and host countries. In-
terestingly,these results hold for both developed and
developing countries, but the effect at first seems to
be larger for developed countries.However,once we
adjust for educational quality, the effect of welfare-
state generosity on skill composition increases for
immigration from developing countries and con-
verges to that experienced by immigration from
developed countries.
Policy implications
To sum up, our findings suggest that immigration re-
gimes affect the skill composition of migrants. When
migration is free as in the case of mobility within the
EU, the generosity of the welfare state attracts un-
skilled immigrants,whilst when migration is restricted
and is demand driven by the host country and its vot-
ers, immigration tends to be more skilled. One poten-
tial implication of those findings is that is provides
justification for reasonable restrictions on access to
welfare benefits,i.e.being conditional on the payment
of contributions,imposed by countries such as the UK
for EU migrants who benefit from free mobility.
Another important implication of our finding that
under free-migration the generosity of the welfare
state acts as a magnet for the unskilled suggests that
harmonizing the minimum welfare provision within
the EU may be an option to reduce the negative
effect of the welfare state on the skill composition of
EU immigrants under free-migration.
As for restrictive migration, it is clear from our ana-
lysis that immigration policies favoring highly skilled
migrants need to take into account educational qual-
ity.If immigration countries aim to attract the highly
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skilled, then using educational levels as a signal for
skill is not sufficient. In other words, a selective im-
migration scheme based solely on years of education
will not be as effective in identifying the highly skilled
as a points-based system where ability (language abil-
ity and labor market experience) is considered.
Fiscal competition in the EU in the presence of
migration
In view of the evidence for the magnet effect within
the EU,there is a concern for tax competition among
EU members to attract productive migrants. Razin
and Sadka (2011) have developed a fiscal competi-
tion model which can shed some light on this phe-
nomenon. In their model a group of countries, such
as the EU, face upward sloping supplies of skilled
and unskilled migrants.The migrants select the host
country of residence through both wage and benefit
generosity channels. Labor and capital income taxes
as well as social benefits are determined in a politi-
cal economy setup by the majority of the native born
voters.Due to a fiscal externality,whereby a voter of
a EU type economy does not internalize the fiscal
burden his decisions impose on all other countries,
there is a disparity between the uncoordinated and
coordinated equilibria. Taxes and welfare state gen-
erosity are higher in the uncoordinated equilibrium
compared with their levels under the coordinated
equilibrium. This implies that there is a need for
coordination within the EU on both immigration
policies and welfare benefit policies.
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